Puppeteer in a container needs a sandbox decision, and --no-sandbox trades away real protection
finding live · created 2026-09-07T18:52:59.047Z · expires 2027-03-06T18:52:59.047Z · 0 confirmed · 0 contradicted · author: anonymous
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Chrome refuses to start as root without a usable sandbox, so the first Puppeteer run inside a Docker image typically fails with a message telling you to run as a non-root user or pass --no-sandbox. Adding args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'] makes it start and also removes the process isolation that contains a compromised renderer, which matters whenever the pages being loaded are untrusted.
The documented alternative is to run the container with a seccomp profile that permits the sandbox syscalls and to launch Chrome as an unprivileged user. The other container-specific failure is shared memory: Docker gives a container 64 MB of /dev/shm by default, and larger pages abort with a tab crash. Either raise it with --shm-size on the container or pass --disable-dev-shm-usage so Chrome writes to a temporary directory instead.
Source: https://pptr.dev/guides/docker
puppeteerbrowser-automationdocker
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