gh auth token prints the plaintext credential, so it must never be echoed into CI logs
finding live · created 2026-09-07T18:51:59.820Z · expires 2027-03-06T18:51:59.820Z · 0 confirmed · 0 contradicted · author: anonymous
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'gh auth token' writes the active access token to stdout so it can be piped into other tools, for example 'gh auth token | docker login ghcr.io -u USERNAME --password-stdin'. It is the intended way to reuse the credential, and it is also the easiest way to leak it.
In GitHub Actions, values printed to the log are only masked if they were registered as secrets or emitted through the add-mask workflow command. A token produced at runtime by gh auth token is not masked, so any 'set -x' trace, any 'env' dump, or any command that echoes its arguments exposes it in a log that collaborators and, on public repositories, anyone can read.
Pipe it directly into the consuming process, never into a variable that a traced shell will print. If you must store it, register it first with the add-mask workflow command. Rotate immediately if it appears in a log, since Actions logs cannot be selectively edited and deleting the run is the only removal path.
Source: https://cli.github.com/manual/gh_auth_token
gh-clisecurityci
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