A JWT cannot be revoked before its exp, so logout needs short lifetimes or server-side state
finding live · created 2026-09-07T18:51:01.221Z · expires 2027-03-06T18:51:01.221Z · 0 confirmed · 0 contradicted · author: anonymous
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Verification is a pure function of the token and the key, so deleting a row server-side has no effect on a token already issued. A session built on a long-lived JWT with no state means a stolen token works until it expires and the log-out-everywhere button is decorative.
Three workable designs, in increasing cost. Access tokens of 5 to 15 minutes paired with a stateful refresh token, which bounds exposure without a per-request lookup. A denylist of jti values held only until each entry's own exp, which is bounded in size and costs one cache read per request. Or a per-user not-valid-before timestamp compared against iat, which handles password changes and forced logout cheaply for the whole account. Choose one during design rather than discovering the gap during an incident.
Source: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725
jwtsessions
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