review

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "artifact": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The artifact to review: unified diff / patch, shell command, plan, config, analysis, agent output, or raw text"
    },
    "artifact_type": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "code_diff",
        "patch",
        "shell_command",
        "plan",
        "config_change",
        "analysis",
        "agent_output",
        "trade",
        "onchain_action",
        "sanctions_screening",
        "general"
      ],
      "default": "general",
      "description": "Type of artifact. 'code_diff' or 'patch' triggers deep code review. 'plan' for architecture/strategy. 'trade' triggers the capital-scale-aware risk-manager review of a proposed entry/exit. 'onchain_action' triggers the on-chain risk review of a proposed transfer/swap/approval/contract call (e.g. a Base MCP action) BEFORE you sign it — catches scam/honeypot tokens, unlimited-allowance drainers, address poisoning, slippage/MEV. 'sanctions_screening' for a compliance/AML result BEFORE acting on it — checks a categorical verdict (e.g. CLEAN) carries its own scope, not an unscoped claim. Tailors focus and suggestions. IMPORTANT for trade/onchain_action/sanctions_screening: a REJECT can happen purely from low confidence on an action you can't undo, even if content-wise the review leaned approve — see the response's reversibility_gate field. When present, epistemic_basis tells you WHY it's a reject: 'evidence_against' means a deterministic engine found a real positive finding (a known-bad address, an on-chain/sanctions hit); 'insufficient_evidence' means no finding either way, just confidence below the reversibility floor — different situations, do not treat them identically if your own logic branches on the reason."
    },
    "context": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "What you are trying to accomplish, why now, success criteria"
    },
    "concerns": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Specific things to check (e.g. 'production safety', 'edge cases in trading logic', 'regulatory risk')"
    },
    "severity_threshold": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "blocker",
        "high",
        "medium",
        "all"
      ],
      "default": "all",
      "description": "Minimum severity to report"
    },
    "include_trading_state": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "default": false,
      "description": "Sentinel mode: inject live Sovereign Earner state (equity, regime, open position, PnL) for trading-related reviews. Highly recommended for any trading or risk decision."
    },
    "sign": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "default": false,
      "description": "Return a PORTABLE SIGNED proof of this verdict (binds verdict + artifact hash + our pubkey), including a content-addressed decision_ref = sha256(JCS({artifact_hash, artifact_type, policy_version, verdict, source_class})). Attach it to your output so a downstream agent can confirm via verify_proof — WITHOUT trusting you or us — that invinoveritas issued this verdict for this exact artifact. The agent-to-agent trust handshake. For artifact_type=trade|onchain_action|sanctions_screening, the proof also carries source_class ('agent_reported' today — no mediation-point integration exists yet) and, when applicable, a vantage_limitation field disclosing that the verdict is occurrence evidence, not an absence/completeness claim — check it before treating an irreversible-class verdict as sufficient on its own. The proof also carries an opaque engine_generation counter (informational, not bound into decision_ref) — compare it across two proofs to detect a backend/judgment-engine change between calls without us disclosing which model we run."
    },
    "related_proof_event": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "Optional: if the artifact being reviewed IS another party's already-signed verdict proof (a verdict-of-verdict re-review), pass that proof's full signed event ({id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content, sig}). We independently re-verify it ourselves before its source_class can affect this call's own — capped, never upgraded (an independent_mediator call reviewing an agent_reported inner verdict stays agent_reported). Fails closed to agent_reported if the inner event doesn't verify, regardless of your own registry status. One hop only. HONEST SCOPE: we verify the cited event's own authenticity, not that it's actually the thing your artifact claims to be re-reviewing."
    },
    "intended_audience": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional: declare who/what this verdict is intended for (your own DID, endpoint URL, or gateway identifier). Bound into decision_ref so it can't be silently stripped or altered once issued. NOT independently verified — a reader compares this against their own identity and treats a mismatch as a signal the proof may be presented outside its intended context, a real context-binding replay-protection gap that earlier policy versions had no way to represent at all."
    },
    "confidentiality_tier": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "hash_only",
        "partial_disclosure",
        "full_disclosure"
      ],
      "default": "hash_only",
      "description": "Which privacy/evidentiary tradeoff this verdict should use, only meaningful with sign=true. 'hash_only' (default): the proof carries only artifact_hash, raw content never disclosed — strongest privacy, weakest standalone evidentiary value (a third party can't confirm what the hash corresponds to without your later cooperation). 'partial_disclosure': pass disclosed_summary, bound raw into decision_ref, so a third party gets real checkable context without full exposure. 'full_disclosure': records intent to publish this verdict to the public /ledger (full_disclosure_requested=true in the proof) — strongest evidentiary tier, but actual publication is still a separate curated step on our side, not yet fully self-serve."
    },
    "disclosed_summary": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Only used when confidentiality_tier='partial_disclosure'. A real, human-readable description of the reviewed artifact/decision you're choosing to make public — bound raw into decision_ref. Ignored for other tier values."
    },
    "intended_verifier": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional: a CAIP-10 string naming the specific on-chain verifier/gate this verdict is meant to be checked against, e.g. 'eip155:8453:0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432'. Bound into decision_ref (itself inside the schnorr-signed content) so it achieves real crypto-level domain separation — the raw signed bytes otherwise bind only to our pubkey + content, nothing to a specific chain/contract, so a proof is technically replayable against any gate willing to accept it. NOT independently verified — a gate compares this against its own chain_id/address."
    },
    "request_capture_ref": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional: a requester-controlled commitment (a hash/id you generated and can independently prove existed at request-time) that this artifact was submitted for review — the captured-admission-v0 review profile (trustless-ai/recompute-kit). Echoed back verbatim in the response's admission_receipt. NOT independently verified by us; closes the /ledger raw-tape-vs-published gap only for requesters who opt in."
    },
    "action_binding": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "Optional: the exact real-world action this verdict authorizes — tool identity, materialized (not templated) arguments, and the id of the agent that will execute it, e.g. {'tool': 'place_order', 'agent_id': 'your-stable-agent-id', 'args': {...}}. v14+: `tool` and `args` are bound as SEPARATE preimage fields (action_binding_tool_hash = sha256(tool), action_binding_args_hash = sha256(RFC-8785-JCS(args))) so a verifier can assert 'same tool, different arguments' as a checkable statement; `agent_id` is bound as a plain string (action_binding_agent_id, not hashed). All bound DIRECTLY into decision_ref — so the verdict commits to the exact action, not just the free-text `artifact` argument or the verdict conclusion. Recomputing decision_ref without byte-identical tool/args/agent_id values produces a different hash: an approval cannot be replayed against a different tool, different materialized arguments, or a different agent. Every sub-key is optional. Max ~8KB JSON-encoded. NOT independently verified by us — we hash exactly what you send. HONEST LIMIT: nothing stops a caller from submitting an under-specified action_binding (e.g. tool+side but not size) and getting an approval reusable across the omitted dimension — that's about who controls what goes into the fingerprint, not how it's hashed."
    },
    "external_evidence": {
      "type": "array",
      "description": "Optional (v17, 2026-09-10): third-party evidence this judgment relied on — e.g. a tool-reliability registry's own historical PASS/FAIL record, worked out live with arian-gogani/nobulex-registry#1. Array of {'source': str, 'record': str (the issuer's OWN exact saved bytes, verbatim — never re-parsed/re-emitted as JSON on our side), 'record_sha256': str (issuer-computed, not independently verified by us), 'evidence_type': str, 'observed_at': ISO 8601, 'validity_until': ISO 8601 | null}. All entries hashed together (RFC-8785-JCS) into external_evidence_hash, bound into decision_ref — so 'this exact evidence was what the verdict considered' is checkable, not just claimed in reasoning text. Does NOT authenticate the issuer, verify record_sha256, or establish freshness — that's the caller's own responsibility before relying on the cited evidence."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "artifact"
  ],
  "examples": [
    {
      "artifact": "systemctl restart my-trading-bot.service && curl -X POST https://api.exchange.com/v3/order -d '{\"side\":\"buy\",\"qty\":100000}'",
      "artifact_type": "shell_command",
      "context": "About to deploy a tuned config and immediately open a 100k-sat position on the exchange",
      "concerns": "Is the order-of-operations safe? What can go wrong between restart and the order?",
      "severity_threshold": "high"
    }
  ]
}